Specialty Board Certification and Federal Civil Rights Statutes by Smith, John J.
Journal of Contemporary Health Law & Policy (1985-2015) 
Volume 11 Issue 1 Article 9 
1994 
Specialty Board Certification and Federal Civil Rights Statutes 
John J. Smith 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.edu/jchlp 
Recommended Citation 
John J. Smith, Specialty Board Certification and Federal Civil Rights Statutes, 11 J. Contemp. Health L. & 
Pol'y 111 (1995). 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.edu/jchlp/vol11/iss1/9 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by CUA Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted 
for inclusion in Journal of Contemporary Health Law & Policy (1985-2015) by an authorized editor of CUA Law 
Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact edinger@law.edu. 
SPECIALTY BOARD CERTIFICATION AND
FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS STATUTES
John J. Smith, M.D., J.D.*
Medical practice in the United States is structured around physician-
specialists, highly trained professionals who affect the character, quality
and cost of health care. Training and credentialing of these specialists is
essentially unregulated by government. Instead, a comprehensive private
regulatory system has developed, based largely on standards created by
the twenty-four specialty boards recognized by the American Board of
Medical Specialties. These private organizations assess physician skill
through an evaluation and examination process, with candidates who
meet board standards being granted certification in a particular specialty
or subspecialty.
The certification process is voluntary and is not legally required in or-
der to practice medicine in any jurisdiction. Likewise, neither the boards
nor any other medical organization encourages health care institutions to
limit specialty practice to certified physicians alone. These realities
notwithstanding, certification profoundly affects physicians' professional
opportunities, raising potential questions under federal civil rights law.
I. THE SPECIALTY BOARD SYSTEM
Specialty training and board certification are more important than ever
in the practice of medicine. More than ninety percent of United States
medical school graduates complete a period of post-graduate training in
the form of a "residency."' A similar percentage of recent graduates are
* The author completed a six-year program in medicine and law at the University of
Virginia in May 1993, and is currently a resident in Diagnostic Radiology and Nuclear
Medicine at the University of Virginia Health Sciences Center. The author would like to
thank Professors Glen 0. Robinson and Walter J. Wadlington of the University of Virginia
School of Law for their invaluable assistance in developing this project.
1. Medical education undertaken after completion of medical school is often referred
to as "post-graduate" medical education. It typically involves a residency, a period of three
or more years, where a new physician learns a specialty under the supervision of exper-
ienced physicians.
112 Journal of Contemporary Health Law and Policy [Vol. 11:111
either board-certified or seeking certification.2 This broad acceptance
gives certification significant impact on hospital privileges, peer and pa-
tient recognition, economic compensation, and the standard of care.
A. The Basics of Certification
As defined by the American Board of Medical Specialties (ABMS), a
specialty board is a separately incorporated, financially independent body
that determines its own requirements and policies for certification, selects
the members of its governing body in accordance with procedures stipu-
lated in bylaws, accepts as candidates for certification persons who fulfill
stated requirements, administers examinations, and issues certificates to
those who submit to and pass evaluations? Currently, the ABMS recog-
nizes twenty-four boards.4 These boards generally have established a
three-step process for achieving certification: (1) graduation from a Liai-
son Committee on Medical Education (LCME) accredited medical
school or its equivalent; (2) completion of an Accreditation Committee
for Graduate Medical Education (ACGME) accredited residency; and (3)
passage of a certification examination. Even after initial certification is
achieved, boards are likely to continue to affect physician-specialists
through periodic recertification.
1. LCME Accredited Medical School
Candidates for certification must complete their undergraduate medi-
2. History of Accreditation of Medical Education Programs, 250 JAMA 1502, 1506
(1983) [hereinafter History of Accreditation].
3. ABMS is comprised of the 24 specialty boards: the American Medical Association,
the American Hospital Association, the Association of American Medical Colleges, the
Council of Medical Specialty Societies, the Federation of State Medical Boards and addi-
tional public representation. Recognition of a board by the ABMS requires approval of
the Liaison Committee for Specialty Boards (LCSB), a committee composed of the ABMS
and the American Medical Association's (AMA) Council on Medical Education. AMERI-
CAN BD. OF MED. SPECIALTIES RES. AND EDUC. FOUND., 1992 ANN. REP. AND REFER-
ENCE HANDBOOK at 34-36, 43, 94, 105 (1992) [hereinafter ABMS HANDBOOK]. Essentially,
recognition by ABMS amounts to acceptance of a board by mainstream organized
medicine.
4. Specialty boards exist for Allergy and Immunology, Anesthesiology, Colon and
Rectal Surgery, Dermatology, Emergency Medicine, Family Practice, Internal Medicine,
Medical Genetics, Neurological Surgery, Nuclear Medicine, Obstetrics and Gynecology,
Ophthalmology, Orthopedic Surgery, Otolaryngology, Pathology, Pediatrics, Physical
Medicine and Rehabilitation, Plastic Surgery, Preventative Medicine, Psychiatry and Neu-
rology, Radiology, Surgery, Thoracic Surgery, and Urology. Id. at 105.
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cal education at an LCME-accredited medical school or its equivalent.5
The LCME includes representatives of the American Medical Associa-
tion (AMA), the Association of American Medical Colleges (AAMC),
the Committee for Accreditation of Canadian Medical Schools, the fed-
eral government, and medical students.6 Specialty boards are not explic-
itly involved at this level of medical education.
2. ACGME Accredited Residency
A second requirement for board certification is postgraduate training
in an ACGME-accredited residency.7 As described in the AMA's Direc-
tory of Graduate Medical Education, the primary purpose of accredita-
tion is to provide a professional judgment as to the quality of a training
program, assuring the potential candidate that it meets the standards set
by professionals in that specialty.8 In addition to its importance in
achieving certification, accreditation has great importance in medicine
generally, as the AMA and other professional organizations implicitly
recommend residency before a physician undertakes independent
practice.
9
The ACGME is composed of the AMA, AAMC, ABMS, the Ameri-
can Hospital Association (AHA), the Council of Medical Specialty Socie-
ties (CMSS, an organization composed of the various medical specialty
societies), nonvoting representatives of the federal government and the
public."° ACGME accreditation requirements and decisions involving in-
dividual specialties are determined in conjunction with the appropriate
Residency Review Committee (RRC), a specialty-specific committee
composed of the AMA, the concerned specialty board, and relevant spe-
cialty societies."
5. Graduates from a medical school accredited by the American Osteopathic Associ-
ation will also qualify.
6. History of Accreditation, supra note 2, at 1504.
7. Some who are intimately familiar with the certification and accreditation process
believe that specialty programs can be accredited without concurrent existence of certifica-
tion programs, especially in small subspecialties where a full certification mechanism is
probably unwarranted. See, e.g., John A. Benson, Jr., Certification and Recertification:
One Approach to Professional Accountability, 114 ANN. INTERN. MED. 238, 241 (1991).
8. AMERICAN MED. ASs'N DIRECTORY OF GRADUATE MED. EDUC. PROGRAMS 9
(1992) [hereinafter AMA DIRECTORY].
9. Id. at 16 (revising the General Requirements of the Essentials of Accredited Resi-
dencies in Graduate Medical Education).
10. Id. at 1.
11. See Joseph Neff Ewing, Jr., Standards Affecting Training Programs, in LEGAL As-
PECTS OF CERTIFICATION AND ACCREDITATION 87, 89 (Donald G. Langsley ed., 1983).
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The specialty boards influence ACGME decisions at several levels.
The boards are represented on the ACGME by the ABMS and are im-
portant members of their respective RRCs. Another powerful influence
over ACGME decisions is the certification standards themselves: as
board certification is generally the ultimate goal for physicians-in-train-
ing, accreditation standards for their training programs often reflect certi-
fication standards.
3. Certification By Specialty Board
Following graduation from an LCME-accredited medical school and
successful completion of an ACGME-accredited residency, a physician
seeking certification must satisfy the clinical proficiency and examination
requirements of a specialty board for his specialty. Clinical competence
evaluations are rarely invoked to deny certification due to the subjective
nature of the evaluations.12 Consequently, the final certification require-
ment is usually successful performance on written, and in many cases
written and oral, examinations.
4. Recertification
Originally, certification was a one-time process: once certified, a physi-
cian was certified for life. Faced with criticism that this system did little
to encourage physicians to stay abreast of current medical knowledge, the
ABMS issued a statement in 1973 endorsing the principle of recertifica-
tion. 3 By 1992, most specialty boards had adopted mandatory recertifi-
cation requirements, largely by issuing "time limited" certificates to
newly-certified physicians. 4 Such certificates expire after passing a
stated period of time and can only be reissued after a recertification
examination.
There are two types of ACGME accreditation requirements: general and special. General
requirements are applicable to all residency programs, while special requirements are spe-
cialty-specific. Decisions made regarding special requirements are made by the ACGME,
acting on the proposal of the appropriate Residency Review Committee (RRC). See also
AMA DIRECTORY, supra note 8, at 9. Accreditation decisions on individual programs may
be made either by the ACGME, or delegated by the ACGME to an RRC. Id. at 1.
12. John M. Eisenberg, Evaluating Internists' Clinical Competence, 4 J. GEN. INTER-
NAL MED. 139, 140 (1989) (noting a recent study that only 2.5% of certification candidates
in Internal Medicine did not receive satisfactory clinical ratings from their residency pro-
grams, while approximately 27% of first-time applicants failed the written examination).
13. ABMS HANDBOOK, supra note 3, at 59.
14. Donald G. Langsley, Medical Competence and Performance Assessment, 266
JAMA 977, 978 (1991).
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B. Implications of Certification
The specialty board certification system amounts to a voluntary, pri-
vate system of specialty regulation that uniformly applies standards to
physician-applicants. It is largely controlled by the AMA, ABMS, and
the boards themselves, with essentially no direct government oversight.
The medical community's overwhelming acceptance of the system caused
it to become quite pervasive and influential in American medical prac-
tice, with implications for virtually all U.S. physicians.
1. The Position of the Boards
Specialty boards tend to minimize the impact of certification on medi-
cal practitioners and the practice of medicine. The American Board of
Internal Medicine (ABIM) views certification as recognition of a number
of years of specialty training and the demonstration of medical knowl-
edge and clinical judgment, the latter established by an examination ad-
ministered by the Board."5 Individual boards and the ABMS stress that
certification is not a license, nor has any legislative body authorized the
boards to issue such a license. 6 The boards also emphasize that certifica-
tion is not necessary to practice a specialty or subspecialty.1
7
A respected authority on certification, John A. Benson, Jr., M.D., has
noted that board certification has practical implications that the boards
cannot control.'8 These practical implications include increased salary,
lower malpractice insurance rates, admission to hospital staffs, election to
membership in professional societies, and credibility in expert testi-
mony.' 9 Dr. Benson believes that boards cannot ignore these implica-
tions of certification when considering the potential effects of their
certificates.2°
2. Practical Implications of Board Certification
As Dr. Benson has noted, there, are numerous real-world benefits of
board certification. These benefits, the result of broad professional ac-
15. Goussis v. Kimball, 813 F. Supp. 352, 355 (E.D. Pa. 1993) (citing to affidavit of
John J. Norcini, Jr., M.D., Vice President for Evaluation and Research of the American
Board of Internal Medicine).
16. Id. (rejecting plaintiff's claim that denial of ABIM certification in endocrinology
and metabolism subspecialties involved state action).
17. Id.
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ceptance of the board system, explain why nearly all U.S. physicians vol-
untarily subject themselves to specialty training and the board
certification process. These same benefits indicate the power that certifi-
cation and the boards have assumed in the health care system.
Hospital staff privileges are perhaps the most fundamental and impor-
tant benefit related to certification. Such privileges allow a physician the
right to admit patients and practice medicine in an institution. These
privileges are important for all physicians, but they are crucial to special-
ists, such as surgeons and anesthesiologists whose practice absolutely re-
quires the facilities of a hospital.
Hospitals often will limit categories of work to board-certified special-
ists, effectively excluding non-certified physicians.2 The AHA has en-
couraged hospitals to use certification as an important factor in the
decision to grant privileges.22 The federal government, through the
Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA), also recognizes certifica-
tion as an important element in granting privileges.
23
The ABMS recognizes certification as only one of a number of factors
contributing to privilege decisions.24 Its statement on "Delineation of
Staff Privileges" emphasizes that there is no specific requirement that a
physician be board certified in order to practice a specialty or sub-
specialty in a hospital.25 The same document also stresses that staff privi-
leges are an institutional responsibility, distinctly separate from the
certification process.26
Peer recognition is another benefit of board certification. 27 Board cer-
tification is frequently a prerequisite for membership in prestigious pro-
fessional societies,28 membership that may be all but required to advance
professionally and academically in certain specialties.29
Patients may also consider board certification when seeking a physi-
cian. Today's patients, particularly the more educated and affluent, will
21. STEVEN JONAS, MEDICAL MYSTERY: THE TRAINING OF DOCTORS IN THE UNITED
STATES 231 (1978).
22. See ROSEMARY STEVENS, AMERICAN MEDICINE AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 253
(1971).
23. Gerald E. Thomson, The Future Effects of Failure to Be Certified, in AMERICAN
BD. OF INTERNAL MED., SUMMER CONFERENCE REPORT 44 (1989).
24. ABMS HANDBOOK, supra note 3, at 52-53.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Benson, supra note 7, at 239.
28. Id.
29. See Treister v. American Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons, 396 N.E.2d 1225 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1979).
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often bypass generalists and directly consult specialists.30 In such an
environment, a non-certified physician may be at a competitive
disadvantage.31
Many believe that certified physicians enjoy higher salaries than their
noncertified peers. As early as the 1930s, specialists received consistently
higher incomes than general practitioners.32 Some commentators believe
that this difference is the product of longer hours worked by certified
specialists.3 3 Others, however, note a significant income advantage with-
out such qualification.34
Finally, board certification has an impact on medical malpractice, in
establishing both the standards for expert testimony and the standard of
practice for physicians accused of malpractice. Some believe that board-
certified practitioners should be held to a higher standard of care, a stan-
dard that supersedes the "locality" rule.35 Others see certification as hav-
ing an impact upon the entire malpractice proceeding, affecting the
thinking and decisions of both judges and juries.
36
II. CERTIFICATION AND CIVIL RIGHTs
The private system of- medical specialty regulation developed by the
specialty boards does not necessarily affect all physicians equally. In par-
ticular, some groups of physicians who share similar ethnic, cultural, edu-
cational, or physical characteristics fail to achieve certification in
disproportionate numbers. Disparate impact raises the question of
whether these results are the consequence of legitimate, uniformly ap-
plied certification standards, or whether these results are caused by other
factors. This question has legal implications in federal civil rights law.
Two identifiable groups in particular, international medical graduates
30. STEVENS, supra note 22, at 196.
31. Note that here the effect of board certification may not be as strong as recognition
in the peer context because there are numerous non-ABMS boards that may be willing to
certify a physician not certified by an ABMS board. In addition, a physician may be able
to hold himself out to the public as a specialist, regardless of certification status. In any
event, even relatively sophisticated health care consumers may be unaware of the differ-
ence between a non-ABMS board certified physician and one certified by an ABMS board.
32. STEVENS, supra note 22, at 176.
33. Benson, supra note 7, at 241.
34. Thomson, supra note 23, at 45.
35. See, e.g., Buck v. St. Clair, 702 P.2d 781 (Idaho 1985) (holding that the local stan-
dard of care for "nationally-certified specialists" is the same as the national standard of
care).
36. Thomson, supra note 23, at 45.
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and disabled medical graduates, may be representative of the uneven im-
pact of the certification process.
A. International Medical Graduates
International medical graduates (IMGs) are graduates of medical
schools outside of the United States and Canada.37 IMGs are largely for-
eign-born, though a substantial number of U.S.-born, foreign-trained
physicians are considered IMGs. s IMGs often are viewed as "second
class" physicians by their U.S.-trained colleagues, tolerated largely as a
solution to a perceived shortage of physicians.
39
IMGs are historically far less successful than their U.S.- and Canadian-
educated peers in obtaining board certification. Only thirty-two percent
of IMGs taking the ABIM certification examination pass the first time,
while eighty-two percent of U.S. and Canadian medical school graduates
pass the certification exam the first time. 4 Though the cause of this dis-
crepancy is yet to be fully explained, various non-discriminatory factors
are thought to account for the difference. These factors include inferior
medical school training, individual differences in ability, and lack of profi-
ciency in the English language.41
Today, IMGs comprise at least twenty percent of physicians practicing
in the United States and they are becoming increasingly accepted by or-
ganized medicine.42 Despite this progress, there is tension between fully
integrating IMGs into the American medical community and legitimate
efforts to maintain the quality of U.S. physicians. This tension is evi-
denced by the extensive requirements for IMG admission to ACGME-
37. Note the term "IMG" has replaced "foreign medical graduate" (FMG). The terms
are synonymous.
38. Wayne Hearn, Medical Groups Trying to Help IMGs Overcome Discrimination,
AMERICAN MED. NEWS, Jan. 4, 1993, at 16 (noting that today, approximately 3.4% of all
U.S. physicians are U.S.-born IMGs, which compares to a corresponding figure of 18.6%
for foreign-born IMGs). Id.
39. STEVENS, supra note 22, at 397-98 (explaining that foreign physicians were en-
couraged to come to the United States at the beginning of the Korean War because of a
physician shortage).
40. John J. Norcini et al., Predictors of the Performance of Foreign Medical Graduates
on the 1982 Certifying Examination in Internal Medicine, 256 JAMA 3367, 3368 (1986).
41. Id. at 3367 (citations omitted). It is interesting to note that graduates from Austra-
lian and British medical schools scored significantly higher than other IMGs. Id. at 3369.
While this information could be used to support the contention that the quality of under-
graduate medical education is a key factor in obtaining board certification, the largely cau-
casian ethnic make-up of these IMGs may support an allegation of discrimination.
42. Id. at 3367.
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accredited residencies and their eligibility for specialty board certifica-
tion. In addition federal legislation has been enacted which is designed to
limit the number of foreign-national IMGs permitted to immigrate to the
United States.43
B. The Disabled
Persons with significant physical disabilities" are thought to comprise
at least thirteen percent of the general population, though little attention
has been paid to their civil rights until relatively recently.45 Federal pro-
tection for the disabled became firmly established with the Rehabilitation
Act of 1973,46 protection greatly expanded by the Americans with Disa-
bilities Act of 1990.4
7
The disabled are grossly underrepresented in medicine. Surveys esti-
mate that only 2.6% of physicians and 0.25% of medical students are dis-
abled. 4a Disabled rights advocates contend these disparities reflect a
resistance on the part of organized medicine to recognize the differing
levels of dexterity required for the various specialties, while organizations
that establish standards for health care providers generally represent
their standards as necessary to the practice of medicine.
III. ANALYSIS: THE BOARDS AND FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS STATUTES
A. Introduction to Statutory Protections
Multiple civil rights statutes provide a variety of overlapping protec-
tions to a number of identifiable groups.
43. See, e.g., AMA DIREcrORY, supra note 8, at 6-7, 21. See also Immigration and
Naturalization Act § 2120), 8 U.S.C.A. § 11820) (West Supp. 1994) (limiting IMG
immigration).
44. Those considered "disabled" for civil rights purposes often include individuals who
are mentally disabled, or who have substance abuse problems, in addition to the physically
disabled. This discussion will focus exclusively on the physically disabled. Note also that
terminology in this area is constantly evolving; an older term for "disabled" is "handi-
capped," and one often hears the term "challenged" being applied to individuals whose
characteristics differ from what is subjectively considered "normal." For the sake of consis-
tency, this analysis will refer to all such persons as "disabled."
45. Brian McCormick, Disabled Face Barriers to Medicine, AMERICAN MED. NEWS,
Jan. 4, 1993, at 12.
46. See infra section III.F of this text discussing the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.
47. See infra section III.G of this text discussing the Americans with Disabilities Act of
1990.
48. McCormick, supra note 45, at 12.
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B. 42 U.S.C. 1981
1. History and Application
Originally, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 was enacted shortly after the Civil War as
a general civil rights statute, intended to afford nonwhites equal treat-
ment.49 As amended in 1991, and now known as The Civil Rights Act of
1991, it provides:
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall
have the same right in every State and Territory to make and
enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the
full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security
of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall
be subject to like punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses,
and exactions of every kind, and to no other.
50
This language addresses intentional racial discrimination by public and
private actors.5 ' Coverage is limited to four specifically enumerated ac-
tivities: (1) making and enforcing a contract; (2) suing in court and giving
evidence; (3) securing the benefits of law; and (4) receiving punishment,
licenses, taxes, and penalties.52 Amendments in 1991 reinforced both the
protection of contractual rights and the applicability to non-government
actions.53
49. The Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 39, 14 Stat. 27 (1866) (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. § 1981 (Supp. V 1993)).
50. 42 U.S.C. § 1981.
51. See General Bldg. Contractors Ass'n, Inc. v. Pennsylvania, 458 U.S. 375, 382-90
(1982) (proposing that § 1981 only reaches intentional discrimination and that § 1981 pro-
tection is almost certainly unavailable to white, U.S.-born IMGs). There is some debate as
to whether § 1981 covers white persons who are discriminated against on the-basis of na-
tional origin, religion or race. See Zaklama v. Mt. Sinai Med. Ctr., 842 F.2d 291, 295 (11th
Cir. 1988). Despite the reservation of some courts, it is not inconceivable that a court
would find § 1981 coverage for an ostensibly "white" foreign national discriminated against
on the basis of national origin, race, religious beliefs or other covered category.
52. Brown v. Federation of State Med. Bds. of the United States, No. 82-C-7398, 1985
WL 1659, at *6 (N.D. Ill. May 31, 1985).
53. Specifically, the 1991 Civil Rights Act added subsections (b) and (c) to address
these issues:
(b) For purposes of this section, the'term "make and enforce contracts" includes
the making, performance, modification, and termination of conitracts, and the en-
joyment of all benefits, privileges, terms, and conditions of the contractual
relationship.
(c) The rights protected by this section are protected against impairment by non-
governmental discrimination and impairment under color of State law.
42 U.S.C. § 1981(b), (c).
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a. A § 1981 Claim in the Context of Board Certification
One plausible theory for § 1981 coverage is found in the protections
that it affords nonwhites in making and enforcing contracts. This argu-
ment considers third party interference in the right to contract. Specifi-
cally, it may be asserted that specialty boards, by refusing to certify
nonwhite physicians, are intentionally impairing those physicians' ability
to establish a "contract" to practice medicine. Such a claim would re-
quire liability for the indirect actions of the specialty boards because the
boards do not directly contract for physicians' medical services. Under
this theory, an expansive definition of "contract," encompassing non-
traditional employment arrangements, such as hospital privileges, would
also be necessary.
2. Analysis: The Boards and § 1981
Section 1981 has been applied to parties having only an indirect influ-
ence on a protected individual's right to contract. In Zaklama v. Mt. Si-
nai Medical Center,5 4 § 1981 was found to encompass a foreign-born and
educated physician's challenge to his dismissal from a residency pro-
gram. 5 Here, liability was alleged to apply to individuals with whom the
physician had no contractual relationship. 6 Citing a related decision by
the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit,
the district court held that there was nothing in the language of § 1981
which suggested that it should be limited to individuals who have a direct
contractual relationship with the protected person.57
A traditional contract need not be at issue for an individual to maintain
a § 1981 challenge. Specifically, § 1981 has been applied to situations
where physicians were denied hospital privileges.5 8 Together with the
54. 842 F.2d 291 (11th Cir. 1988).
55. Id. at 295.
56. Id. at 292-95. Specifically, Zaklama was employed as a resident by Jackson Memo-
rial Hospital. As part of his training, Zaklama was expected to rotate through three other
local hospitals, while still technically remaining a resident in the Jackson Memorial Pro-
gram. At one of these hospitals, Mt. Sinai Medical Center, Zaklama was subject to nega-
tive evaluations and was subsequently barred by Mt. Sinai staff from the hospital. On the
basis of the Mt. Sinai actions, Jackson Memorial terminated Zaklama's participation in its
residency program. Note that Zaklama alleged racial, national origin, and religious dis-
crimination in his complaint against both hospitals. Id. at 292-94.
57. Id. at 295 (citing Sibley Memorial Hosp. v. Wilson, 488 F.2d 1338 (D.C. Cir. 1973))
(involving a challenge under Title Vii of the Civil Rights Act of 1964)). See infra notes 104-
07 and accompanying text.
58. See, e.g., Shah v. Memorial Hosp., No. 86-0064-D, 1988 WL 161176 (W.D. Va. July
27, 1988), affd, 875 F.2d 316 (4th Cir. 1989).
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holding of Zaklama, these decisions suggest that a third party who inter-
feres with a physician's ability to gain staff privileges may incur liability.
Because board certification is often used as a prerequisite for staff privi-
leges, any intentionally discriminatory use of board certification could be
characterized as such third-party interference.
A § 1981 claim also requires discriminatory intent. A prima facie case
is established if the party alleging discrimination: (1) is a member of a
protected class; (2) was qualified for the position held; and (3) was dis-
charged while a person outside of the class with equal or lesser qualifica-
tions was retained.59 However, it is extremely difficult for an individual
who has failed an objective, uniformly-graded certification examination
to establish himself as "qualified" for board certification. Such an indi-
vidual must successfully attack the validity of certification standards un-
derlying the examination, a particularly difficult proposition given the
deference courts generally have afforded academic standards in the medi-
cal setting.6" A plausible prima facie case of discrimination may exist
where a board has employed subjective criteria, such as clinical compe-
tence or character requirements, to deny a protected individual
certification.6
C. 42 U.S.C. § 1983
1. Introduction to 42 U.S.C. § 1983
Congress enacted 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to provide an enforcement mecha-
nism for rights guaranteed under the Fourteenth Amendment.62 As such,
its protections parallel those of the due process and equal protection doc-
59. Zaklama, 842 F.2d at 293 (citing Lee v. Russell County Bd. of Educ., 684 F.2d 769,
773 (11th Cir. 1982)). The court also noted that the requirements of a prima facia case
under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 are essentially the same as those for a claim under Title VII. See
also infra notes 92-117 and accompanying text discussing Title VII.
60. See, e.g., Regents of the Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing, 414 U.S. 214 (1985) (explaining
the deference that courts afford academic standards in the medical setting). An attack on
certification standards would presumably be based on some objective demonstration of a
protected individual's ability to practice medicine, a demonstration which would have to
establish that individual as "qualified" to practice as a specialist. The argument would then
be that certification standards somehow unfairly failed to recognize this individual as
"qualified." Note how difficult it would be to develop "objective" standards for use in the
plaintiff's argument.
61. Given that such criteria are very infrequently invoked where an individual has
successfully completed an ACGME-accredited residency, such an argument may be diffi-
cult to establish in practice.
62. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988).
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trines, complete with the requirement of state action.63 Originally
adopted as part of the Civil Rights Act of 1871,' § 1983 now provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regula-
tion, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of
Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the
United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to
the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured
by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured
in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for
redress.
65
Courts generally recognize two requirements for a successful § 1983
claim: (1) an individual must be acting under color of state law; and (2)
the action must result in the deprivation of a right, privilege and/or immu-
nity secured by federal laws or the Constitution.66 Consequently, liability
is implicated in a manner similar to Constitutional due process or equal
protection claims.
2. Section 1983 Claims Against the Specialty Boards
Like the analysis itself, the argument for board liability under § 1983
resembles claims made under the Fourteenth Amendment concepts of
due process or equal protection. To succeed, such a claim must establish
that a board action amounted to a state action and intentionally deprived
an individual of a legal right.67
3. Analysis: The Specialty Boards and § 1983
Section 1983 was the subject of recent litigation against the American
Board of Internal Medicine. Goussis v. Kimball' involved allegations by
a foreign-born and educated physician that the ABIM's certification ex-
amination in endocrinology and metabolism was prepared and graded
63. Id. Section 1983 does not itself provide any rights, but provides remedies for Con-
stitutional violations. As such, it is the Constitution that provides the "protection" spoken
of and not § 1983.
64. The Civil Rights Act of 1871, ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13 (1871) (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. § 1983).
65. 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
66. See Goussis v. Kimball, 813 F. Supp. 352, 355 (E.D. Pa. 1993) (citing Bougher v.
University of Pittsburgh, 882 F.2d 74, 78 (3d Cir. 1989)).
67. Note that § 1983 lacks the reference to "nonwhites" present in § 1981. This makes
the protections of § 1983 theoretically available to all persons who are denied a right other-
wise guaranteed by law, regardless of that person's race, sex, or ethnic background.
68. 813 F. Supp. 352 (E.D. Pa. 1993).
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with intent to minimize the scores obtained by IMGs.6 9
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Penn-
sylvania focused closely on the state action requirement in evaluating Dr.
Goussis's claim.7" The court noted that there were at least three relevant
tests which might be applicable: (1) the "close nexus" test, which deter-
mines whether the state can be deemed responsible for the specific con-
duct of which the plaintiff complains; (2) the "symbiotic relationship"
test, which examines the overall relationship of the parties to determine
whether or not the state has "insinuated itself into a position of interde-
pendence with [the acting party]" sufficiently to be recognized as a joint
participant in the challenged activity; or (3) the "public function" test,
which inquires whether the government is using the private party to avoid
Constitutional obligations or to engage in activities that were the exclu-
sive prerogative of the state.71 The court further observed that more than
one test may be applicable to a specific situation.72
In its analysis, the Goussis court characterized the ABIM as a private,
nonprofit, charitable organization, which is neither licensed nor regulated
by any government body. 3 It also observed that the ABIM did not re-
ceive any government aid.74 The court specifically held that: (1) the ac-
tions of the ABIM cannot be treated as actions of the government itself;
(2) the state had not exercised coercive power or provided significant en-
couragement to the ABIM; (3) certification is not necessary for the prac-
tice of medicine; and, (4) the conduct of the ABIM is not that which is
traditionally the exclusive prerogative of the state.75 Furthermore, the
court commented that preparation of a widely-recognized test by the
ABIM, a test on which state institutions may rely for academic decisions,
is not sufficient to convert private conduct into state action.76 Consider-
69. Id. at 353-55. Dr. Goussis was certified by the ABIM in general internal medicine,
and had completed several fellowships in endocrinology. Four unsuccessful attempts to
pass the ABIM's certification examination in endocrinology and metabolism preceded the
action. Despite his lack of certification in the subspecialty, Dr. Goussis practiced as a spe-
cialist in endocrinology and metabolism. Id.
70. Id. at 355.
71. Id. at 356-57 (citing Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 841 (1982); Jackson v.
Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974); Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 301 (1966);
Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 725 (1961)).
72. Id. at 357.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 357-58.
76. Id. at 358 (citing Johnson v. Education Testing Serv., 754 F.2d 20 (1st Cir.), cert.
denied, 472 U.S. 1028 (1985)).
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ing these facts, the court concluded that the ABIM was not a state actor
under any of its enumerated tests or combinations thereof.77
Thus, Goussis provides strong authority against the applicability of
§ 1983 to the specialty boards, particularly given the Goussis court's char-
acterization of the ABIM and of certification in general. Furthermore,
the court's state action analysis is broadly applicable to other constitu-
tional and statutory doctrines which contain similar requirements.
The facts and allegations underlying Goussis both detract from and
augment the strength of the court's analysis. Initially, Dr. Goussis may
not have been the strongest plaintiff to bring a civil rights action. He was
already certified by the ABIM in general internal medicine and was prac-
ticing as an endocrinologist, despite his lack of certification in the sub-
specialty.7" Though the court's holding seems to preclude the finding of
state action regardless of a plaintiff's circumstances, a plaintiff who is un-
able to gain any board certification, and is consequently precluded from
some aspect of medical practice, may command more favorable
treatment.79
Goussis also demonstrates the difficulty of establishing discriminatory
intent on the part of a specialty board. Dr. Goussis alleged that the
ABIM selected its questions and graded its exams so as to deliberately
minimize the scores of IMGs.s0 As far as is apparent from the complaint
and court opinion, the only grounds for these allegations were discussions
Dr. Goussis had with other IMGs who had failed the same examination.8 '
There is no indication that he possessed evidence of an attempt to deny
him certification, or that certification standards were not uniformly ap-
plied.82 The cursory nature of the complaint demonstrates the extreme
difficulty of establishing intent where a board has adopted certification
standards without regard to the implications for various identifiable
groups of physicians, and uniformly applied those standards.8 3
77. Id. at 358.
78. Id. at 354.
79. A particularly sympathetic example may be found in a licensed, IMG physician
who because of a local hospital's policy of requiring certification for staff privileges, is
effectively limited in the practice of medicine.
80. Goussis, 813 F. Supp. at 353.
81. Id.
82. See generally id. at 352. Because the case was decided on summary judgment,
there was presumably some discovery before the board's motion was granted. Id. at 353,
360.
83. This disregard for the particular attributes of any identifiable group of physicians
in standard setting is crucial, regardless of the motives for such a policy. For example, if a
board was to expressly consider the problems faced by IMGs in setting certification stan-
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Finally, and perhaps most importantly, a successful § 1983 claim must
prove that some legal right was infringed. While beyond the scope of this
discussion, there is no indication that a court would find that certification
implicates such a right, particularly given the state action requirement of
the Fourteenth Amendment.
8 4
D. 42 U.S.C. § 1985 (3)
1. Introduction to 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3)
As a general civil rights statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) protects individu-
als from conspiracies designed to deprive them of legal rights or privi-
leges.8 5 The Supreme Court has held that a § 1985(3) claim must allege
four elements: (1) a conspiracy; (2) for the purpose of depriving, directly
or indirectly, any person or class of persons of the equal protection of the
law, or of equal privileges and immunities of the law; (3) that the alleged
actors have committed some act in furtherance of the conspiracy; and, (4)
that the plaintiff was either "injured in his person or property" or was
"deprived of having and exercising any right or privilege of a citizen of
the United States."8 6 Thus, a § 1985(3) action requires proof of both con-
dards, applicants belonging to other identifiable groups adversely affected by changes im-
plemented to assist the IMGs may be able to establish discriminatory intent in the board's
actions.
84. Such a legal right for the purposes of § 1983 would almost always require an in-
dependent constitutional violation.
85. The language of § 1985(3) provides in pertinent part:
If two or more persons in any State or Territory conspire for the purpose of de-
priving, either directly or indirectly, any person or class of persons of the equal
protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws; or
for the purpose of preventing or hindering the constituted authorities of any State
or Territory from giving or securing to all persons within such State or Territory
the equal protection of the laws; or if two or more persons conspire to prevent by
force, intimidation, or threat, any citizen who is lawfully entitled to vote, from
giving his support or advocacy in a legal manner, toward or in favor of the elec-
tion of any lawfully qualified person as an elector for President or Vice President,
or as a Member of Congress of the United States; or to injure any citizen in per-
son or property on account of such support or advocacy; in any case of conspiracy
set forth in this section, if one or more persons engaged therein do, or cause to be
done, any act in furtherance of the object of such conspiracy, whereby another is
injured in his person or property, or deprived of having and exercising any right
or privilege of a citizen of the United States, the party so injured or deprived may
have an action for the recovery of damages occasioned by such injury or depriva-
tion, against any one or more of the conspirators.
42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (1988).
86. Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 102-03 (1971).
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spiracy and intent to discriminate in the presence of the deprivation of
some legal right.
2. Section 1985(3) and the Specialty Boards
A party wishing to apply § 1985(3) to a specialty board must establish a
conspiracy to intentionally deny a legally protected right. Such a claim is
not limited by the race, gender, or ethnicity of the party alleging the
§ 1985 violation.
3. Analysis: The Boards and § 1985(3)
Goussis v. Kimball specifically addressed the question of § 1985(3) in
the context of board certification. 7 In its analysis, the Goussis court
noted that a § 1985(3) conspiracy between a corporation and one of its
officers may only take place if that officer is acting in a personal, as op-
posed to an official, capacity, or if third parties are alleged to have joined
the conspiracy.'m Holding that ABIM officials named in the complaint
were acting in their official capacities, the court refused to find the con-
spiracy required by § 1985(3).89 Under this decision, it is unlikely that a
specialty board which insures the integrity of its officers and avoids third-
party participation in promulgation of its certification standards would
satisfy the conspiracy requirement of § 1985(3).
Should a conspiracy be found, however, a plaintiff still must establish
an intent to discriminate and demonstrate an injury that implicates a pro-
tected right. As discussed previously, intentional discrimination is diffi-
cult to prove where a board uniformly applies its certification standards.'
Finally, there is much evidence of judicial reluctance to find a legally pro-
tected interest where a benefit or privilege is the result of an academic or
professional judgment based on an individual's intellectual
accomplishments. 9'
87. Goussis v. Kimball, 813 F. Supp. 352, 359 (E.D. Pa. 1983).
88. Id. at 359 (citing Robinson v. Canterbury Village, Inc., 848 F.2d 424, 431 (3d Cir.
1988)). Note that a similar observation was made by the court in Weiss v. York Hosp., 745
F.2d 786, 817 (3d Cir. 1984) (finding that a hospital's medical staff could not conspire with
the hospital because the staff as a whole operated as an officer of the hospital).
89. Goussis, 813 F. Supp. at 359-60.
90. See supra notes 59-60 and accompanying text.
91. See, e.g., Regents of the Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing, 474. U.S. 214 (1985); Board of
Curators of the Univ. of Mo: v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78 (1978).
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E. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
1. Perspective on Title VII
Title VII' is a major component of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The
Act was part of a significant effort to expand federal civil rights protec-
tions in the mid-1960s, extending coverage to many private instances of
discrimination for the first time. Many of the Act's provisions were sub-
ject to modification under the Civil Rights Act of 1991. Title VII specifi-
cally addresses discriminatory employment practices, providing:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or
otherwise to discriminate against any individual with re-
spect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges
of employment, because of such individual's race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or appli-
cants for employment in any way which would deprive or
tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities
or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, be-
cause of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or na-
tional origin.9
Thus, on its face, Title VII applies to employment discrimination on the
basis of race, religion, gender, or national origin. Its protections are not
available to white males or the disabled.
Title VII requires only a showing of disparate impact to establish a
prima facie case of racial discrimination.94 Under the 1991 amendments,
once a plaintiff has carried the burden of proving disparate impact, an
employer must articulate a valid "business justification" for the practice
to escape liability.95 At no point in Title VII is "business justification"
defined.96
92. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (Supp. V 1993).
93. Id.
94. Specifically, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i) provides that an unlawful employ-
ment practice based on disparate impact is established if:
[A] complaining party demonstrates that a respondent uses a particular employ-
ment practice that causes a disparate impact on the basis of race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin and the respondent fails to demonstrate that the challenged
practice is job related for the position in question and consistent with business
necessity.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i).
95. CATHCART & SYNDERMAN, The Civil Rights Act of 1991, ALI-ABA Course of
Study, Advanced Employment Law and Litigation (1992), at § 1.04(b)(1), (3).
96. Id. § 1.04(b)(3).
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2. Title VII in the Context of the Specialty Boards
A Title VII claim must establish that a board practice amounts to ac-
tion by an employer, for which there is no valid business justification, and
that the practice causes a disparate impact on a protected group.97 The
essential components of such a claim are establishing the boards as "em-
ployers" and proving discrimination under the disparate impact test.
3. Analysis: The Boards and Title VII
a. Establishing the Boards as an Employer
A traditional employer-employee arrangement satisfies the require-
ments of Title VIi. The traditional arrangement is not present in the rela-
tionship between the specialty boards and applicants for certification.
Some courts, however, have gone beyond the traditional relationship,
finding the employer-employee requirement satisfied in situations involv-
ing economic necessity and third-party interference with employment. In
these situations, a cause of action was sustained even where the party
alleged to have violated Title VII was not a direct employer of the
plaintiff.
i. The Economic Necessity Test
Courts have applied an economic realities/common law control test to
non-traditional employment situations. This test considers the practical
realities of the relationship at issue, focusing on the employee's depen-
dence on the business to which he renders service, and the extent to
which the one for whom the work is being done has the right to control
the details and means by which the work is to be performed.98
Diggs v. Harris Hospital-Methodist99 applied the economic necessity
test to the termination of an African-American physician's staff privi-
leges. 1" In addition to the basic analysis, the Diggs court noted addi-
tional factors which could be considered in establishing an employer-
employee relationship, including whether the work provided is an inte-
gral part of the business of the "employer" and the intention of the par-
97. Any Title VII claims must first be submitted to the Equal Employment Opportu-
nity Commission; only after such submission can a plaintiff institute a Title VII action.
These procedures are beyond the scope of this paper. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000-2(k) (Supp. IV
1994).
98. See Mares v. Marsh, 777 F.2d 1066, 1067 (5th Cir. 1985).
99. 847 F.2d 270 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 956 (1988).
100. Id.
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ties.' 01 Though the Diggs court did not find an employer-employee
relationship in the case beforeit, the court stressed that the privileges at
issue were not an economic necessity, because the plaintiff enjoyed staff
privileges at other institutions.'" This decision suggests that the exist-
ence of economic necessity may be sufficient to establish the required
relationship. Thus, if a plaintiff can prove that board certification is a
necessity to practice medicine, it is possible that a court applying the eco-
nomic realities/common law control test would find a Title VII employ-
ment relationship.'
0 3
ii. Beyond Traditional Employment
Some courts examining the employment relationship required under
Title VII have found the requirement satisfied where a third party inter-
feres with a plaintiff's employment opportunities. A *classic and broad
articulation of this third-party interference theory is found in Sibley
Memorial Hospital v. Wilson.'"4 Sibley involved a male private duty
nurse who claimed a hospital denied him access to potential patient-em-
ployers solely on the basis of his sex.'0 5 At no time was the nurse an
employee of that hospital.
The Sibley court noted that permitting an employer covered by Title
VII to interfere with a non-employee's employment opportunities in a
discriminatory manner, while prohibiting such discrimination with regard
to its own employees, essentially condones the use of the very employ-
ment criteria that Congress prohibited.' 6 The court went on to find that
the statutory language of Title VII supported coverage for individuals
who were not in a direct relationship with an employer.0 7
Sibley's finding of Title VII coverage has been echoed by numerous
courts.10 8 The doctrine, however, is not uniformly embraced: Diggs re-
101. Id. at 272-73 (citations omitted).
102. Id. at 273.
103. In the absence of any legal requirement that a physician be certified to practice, it
is very unlikely that any court would find board certification an economic necessity.
104. 488 F.2d 1338 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
105. Id. at 1339. Specifically, when a private nurse was requested at a participating
institution, a nondiscriminatory dispatch system provided a nurse without regard to race,
age or sex; the patient always had the right to refuse the services of any particular nurse,
but was obligated to pay a "refused" nurse for an entire day. Because the plaintiff was not
even allowed to present himself to female patients, he was not eligible for the pay due
refused nurses.
106. Id. at 1341.
107. Id.
108. See, e.g., Pardazi v. Cullman Med. Ctr., 838 F.2d 1155, 1156 (11th Cir. 1988) (impli-
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fused to reach the question of third-party interference where the hospital
privileges in question were not an economic necessity."° Diggs, thus,
specifically invoked the economic realities/common law control test as a
de facto threshold for the third-party interference test.110
Given the relative vagueness of the doctrine and its uneven application
by the courts, it is uncertain whether the third-party interference theory
could be successfully invoked against specialty boards. Most instances
where the theory has been supported involved large institutional employ-
ers, such as hospitals, which are clearly covered with respect to their own
employees. 1 ' These same institutions, while not direct employers of the
individuals invoking Title VII, did have significant, direct power over the
individuals' employment opportunities." 2 The specialty boards as small,
independent professional organizations that only indirectly affect a physi-
cian's employment opportunities through third-party application of certi-
fication standards, are hardly comparable to such large institutions. Still,
the significant impact that certification may have on an individual physi-
cian's employment opportunities could conceivably be sufficient to satisfy
a liberal application of the third-party interference theory.
b. Establishing Discrimination Under Disparate Impact
Assuming that an employer-employee relationship is found, discrimi-
nation under a disparate impact test is necessary for a Title VII violation.
A prima facie case requires that: (1) the plaintiff belongs to a racial mi-
nority; (2) the plaintiff was qualified for a job for which the employer was
seeking applicants; (3) despite these qualifications, the plaintiff was re-
jected for the position; and, (4) after this rejection, the position remained
open and the employer continued to seek applicants from persons of the
cating Title VII where a foreign-born physician was unable to finalize an employment con-
tract with a professional corporation when a hospital denied him staff privileges); Doe v.
St. Joseph's Hosp. of Fort Wayne, 788 F.2d. 411, 423 (7th Cir. 1986) (finding a Title VII
claim where a plaintiff alleged a hospital discriminatorily interfered with her opportunities
to provide service to her patients).
109. See Diggs v. Harris Hosp. Methodist, 847 F.2d 270 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 188 U.S.
956 (1988).
110. Id. at 273-74 (acknowledging the acceptance of third-party interference theory by a
number of courts).
111. See, e.g., Pardazi, 838 F.2d at 1115; Sibley, 488 F.2d at 1338 (demonstrating hospi-
tal's referral system affected nurse opportunities).
112. Id. An illustration of such power over an individual's employment opportunities is
hospital privileges, as the granting of such privileges does not establish a traditional em-
ployment relationship between the hospital and a physician, but certainly affects that phy-
sician's ability to practice medicine in that institution.
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complainant's qualifications." 3 The Supreme Court has specifically
stated that the test is not intended to be rigidly applied, but is to serve as
"a sensible, orderly way to evaluate the evidence in light of common ex-
perience as it bears on the critical question of discrimination."
' 1 4
As discussed in the context of a nearly identical test for § 1981, it is
virtually impossible to satisfy these requirements in the absence of a
board's uneven application of some subjective certification standard." 5
Should a prima facie case be demonstrated, however, a claim still may be
defeated by showing a valid business justification for the allegedly dis-
criminatory practice."' This involves proving that the specialty board's
actions at issue were a legitimate application of medical standards, or
were in some other way necessary to preserve the integrity of the activity.
Here, the substantial judicial deference that is afforded medical standard
setting would probably allow any legitimate and necessary board stan-
dard to survive a Title VII action under the "business justification"
language.
17
F. Rehabilitation Act of 1973
1. Perspective
The Rehabilitation Act of 1973 was the first major federal legislation
enacted to specifically address the civil rights of the disabled. 18 The es-
sential provisions of the Act are found at 29 U.S.C. § 794 and are usually
referred to by their public law section number, section 504. This language
provides:
No otherwise qualified individual with handicaps in the United
States, as defined by section 706(8) of this title, shall, solely by
reason of his or her handicap, be excluded from participation in,
be denied the benefits of, or be subject to discrimination under
113. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).
114. Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters,'438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978).
115. See supra notes 59-60 and accompanying text. The requirement that an individual
be "qualified" for a position under a Title VII claim thus appears to collapse the discrimi-
natory impact and intent tests insofar as their practical implications for the specialty
boards.
116. See supra notes 95-96. There is no statutory definition of "valid business
justification."
117. See, e.g., Regents of the Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214 (1985).
118. The language of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 speaks in terms of the "handi-
capped" to refer to those with a covered impairment. As the definition of "handicapped"
under the Rehabilitation Act is identical to the definition of "disability" under the Ameri-
cans with Disabilities Act, this paper will uniformly refer to those individuals meeting
either definition as "disabled." See supra note 44 for further discussion of this terminology.
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any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance or
under any program or activity conducted by any Executive
agency or by the United States postal service."
19
Thus, section 504 requires proof of: (1) a disability; (2) denial of benefits
or participation in a program solely on a basis of that disability; (3) an
individual who is "otherwise qualified" for those benefits or participation;
and, (4) federal funding of the activity at issue.
A threshold requirement for a section 504 claim is a disability. For the
purposes of this section, a disabled person is, "[a]ny person who (i) has a
physical or mental impairment which substantially limits one or more of
such person's major life activities, (ii) has a record of such an impairment,
and (iii) is regarded as having such an impairment." 20 This broad defini-
tion encompasses virtually anyone with a significant physical disability.
The disability at issue must also be the sole reason for denial of a benefit.
A key factor in establishing a section 504 claim involves demonstrating
that an individual is "otherwise qualified" for a denied benefit. Courts
have applied a two-part test: (1) whether the disabled individual is able to
meet the criteria necessary to receive the benefit, regardless of his or her
disability; (2) if not, whether a reasonable accommodation is possible to
allow the individual to receive the benefit. 2 '
Finally, the program or activity at issue must be a recipient of federal
funds. Given that the boards do not currently receive any government
funds, satisfying this requirement is practically impossible. 22 However,
an analysis of section 504 still is relevant for two reasons: (1) the boards
may someday be recipients of federal funds, given increasing government
involvement in health care; and (2) these cas es demonstrate how courts
may interpret similar language in the Americans with Disabilities Act,
under which the prospect of specialty board liability is much more
concrete.
2. Analysis: The Boards and Section 504
Most section 504 disputes involving an individual who satisfies the defi-
nition of "disability" focus on whether that individual was "otherwise
qualified" for a benefit. A number of cases have addressed the definition
119. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (Supp. IV 1992).
120. Id. § 706(8)(B). This definition is very similar to the definition of "disability" in
the Americans with Disabilities Act. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (Supp. V 1993).
121. See infra notes 127-30 and accompanying text.
122. See Goussis v. Kimball, 813 F. Supp. 352, 352-54 (E.D. Pa. 1993).
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of this key requirement in the context of academic and medical standard
setting.
Southeastern Community College v. Davis23 involved a prospective
nursing student with hearing lOSS.124 There, a state college engaged in an
extensive evaluation of its nursing degree requirements in conjunction
with the plaintiff's application, going so far as to consult an outside nurs-
ing expert. 25 Relying heavily on the expert's conclusions that it would
be impossible for the applicant to participate safely in the program and
that modifications necessary for safe participation would severely inter-
fere with its benefits, the college declined to offer the applicant
admission.
126
In evaluating the resulting section 504 claim, the Supreme Court noted
that an "otherwise qualified" individual is one who is able to meet all of a
program's requirements in spite of his or her disability. 127 The Court
then concluded that the plaintiff was not "otherwise qualified" for the
benefit sought, noting that it believed no reasonable accommodation was
possible. 2 ' This holding created the two step inquiry to determine
whether an individual is "otherwise qualified": (1) does a disabled indi-
vidual meet the requirement for a benefit; and (2) if not, is a reasonable
accommodation possible.' 29 The Court was careful to limit the reason-
able accommodation requirement, first by specifically holding that it was
not a mandate for affirmative action. The Court further stated that such
accommodations were limited to instances that did not involve "undue
financial or administrative burdens," or require "a fundamental alteration
in the nature of [a] program."'
130
Taken in its academic and medical standards context, Southeastern
Community College stands for the proposition that disabled persons who
do not meet legitimate professional standards for a benefit, standards that
cannot be reasonably altered to accommodate particular disabilities, are
not considered "otherwise qualified."
Lower federal courts afford similar, if not greater, deference to profes-
sional standards in interpreting the "otherwise qualified" language. The
123. 442 U.S. 397, 400 (1979).
124. Id.
125. Id. at 400-03.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 406.
128. Id. at 409-11.
129. See, e.g., School Bd. of Nassau County, Fla. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 286-89 (1987)
(citing Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 406 (1979)).
130. Southeastern Community College, 442 U.S. at 412-13.
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court in Doherty v. Southern College of Optometry 3' declined to invali-
date clinical proficiency requirements that prevented a disabled student
from becoming an optometrist, even though the requirements were insti-
tuted after the student's matriculation.'32 The Doherty court held that
reasonable accommodation does not require an educational institution to
eliminate a course requirement reasonably necessary to the proper use of
the degree conferred. 33 The court went on to state that courts are ill-
equipped to evaluate the proper emphasis of a curriculum, particularly
where a degree indicates qualification to practice a health profession.3
As certification is a professional standard that recognizes an individual's
ability to practice a specialty, the Doherty analysis is almost certainly ap-
plicable to the boards.
This deference is paralleled in the recent First Circuit opinions in
Wynne v. Tufts University School of Medicine.35 (Wynne 1) and (Wynne
1).136 The Wynne cases involved a medical student with demonstrated
learning disabilities. Despite considerable assistance from the University,
the student continued to fail examinations and was dismissed.' 37 The stu-
dent subsequently contended that the University's refusal to evaluate his
performance by a method other than multiple choice examination vio-
lated his section 504 right to reasonable accommodation.'38
The Wynne I court initially held that the deference given academic de-
131. 862 F.2d 570 (6th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 810 (1989).
132. Id. at 572-73. Specifically, the student in question had retinitis pigmentosa and
associated neurological difficulties; the latter neurological problems limited his manual
dexterity to the extent he could not fulfill the clinical competency requirements. Note that
while the student's retinitis pigmentosa was known to the school, he did not indicate his
additional neurological abnormalities on his application. Id.
133. Id. at 575.
134. Id. at 576.
135. 932 F.2d 19 (1st Cir. 1991).
136. 976 F.2d 791 (1st Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1845 (1993) (Wynne If). Wynne
I, the original First Circuit decision, established criteria for "otherwise qualified," and re-
manded the case to the district court. Wynne II was an appeal of the decision on remand,
where the First Circuit upheld the lower court finding that no violation of section 504
existed.
137. Wynne I, 932 F.2d at 19. The student repeatedly failed courses throughout his first
year of medical school. In an attempt to determine the problem, Tufts University Medical
School provided him with psychological evaluations which revealed several learning disa-
bilities but did not demonstrate dyslexia. The University then allowed him to repeat the
failed courses, this time with the aid of tutors, note takers, and counselling. Id. at 20-23, 27.
138. Id. at 20-24. Wynne contended that he suffered from dyslexia, a condition he
claimed was diagnosed subsequent to his dismissal. He claimed that this condition pre-
vented him from indicating his true knowledge on the multiple-choice tests employed by
Tufts (and all other U.S. medical schools).
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cisions by the Supreme Court in Regents of the University of Michigan v.
Ewing'39 should be extended to the Rehabilitation Act.140 The court
qualified this deference with two conditions: (1) an academic institution
must submit a factual record indicating that it conscientiously sought a
reasonable accommodation; and (2) the Ewing formulation, conditioning
judicial intervention on "a substantial departure from accepted academic
norms," is not a useful test in the context of reasonable accommodation,
as such alternatives may involve new approaches beyond accepted
norms.
14 1
The Wynne I court outlined what its test required in practice: submis-
sion of undisputed fact showing that the academic institution considered
alternative means, their feasibility, cost, and effect on the program.
These facts must support a conclusion that available alternatives would
result in either lowering academic standards or a substantial program al-
teration.142 A court could then rule as a matter of law that the institution
had met its duty of seeking a reasonable accommodation. 43 The Wynne I
court cautioned that if the essential facts were genuinely disputed, or if
there was significant probative evidence of bad faith or pretext, further
fact finding would be necessary. 144 Applying this test to the single affida-
vit submitted by the University, the court refused to uphold a lower
court's summary judgment order.
145
Wynne I appears to set a significant hurdle before any academic institu-
tion seeking to defeat a section 504 claim. In actually applying its stan-
dard in Wynne II, however, the First Circuit appeared much more
deferential to academic institutions. 46 Finding the duty of seeking rea-
sonable accommodation satisfied after the submission of six additional
affidavits, the Wynne II court stated that an academic institution's expla-
nation need not be "airtight": a school need only demonstrate a rational
decision that further accommodation cannot be made without imposing
undue hardship on the academic program. 147 Wynne II, however, quali-
139. 474 U.S. 214 (1985).
140. Id. (noting that. when the judiciary is asked to review the substance of a genuinely
academic matter, it must show great respect for the faculty's professional judgment). This
judgment cannot be overridden unless a substantial departure from normal procedure indi-
cates a lack of professional judgment. Id.
141. Wynne 1, 932 F.2d at 19, 25-26.
142. Id. at 26.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 27-28.
146. Wynne II, 976 F.2d 791, 794-95 (1st Cir. 1992).
147. Id. at 795.
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fled its holding, cautioning that the "fact based" decision should not be
read broadly."'
Admonitions notwithstanding, Wynne I and Wynne 11 support the
proposition that medical standards are afforded substantial deference by
the courts. Taken together, they appear to leave undisturbed the legality
of legitimate medical standards under Southeastern Community College
and Doherty.
G. The Americans with Disabilities Act
1. Introduction to the Americans with Disabilities Act
The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA) 4 9 was a major
expansion of federal civil rights protections available to the disabled, in-
tended to provide a clear and convincing national mandate for the elimi-
nation of discrimination against disabled individuals. 5 ° In essence, the
ADA functions by applying the basic protections of the Rehabilitation
Act of 1973 to general activities undertaken by both government and pri-
vate parties.' 5 ' The Rehabilitation Act remains in force, supplementing
the ADA.
The ADA shares the Rehabilitation Act's definition of disability. Thus,
a disability is defined as, "(A) a physical or mental impairment that sub-
stantially limits one or more of the major life activities of such individual;
(B) a record of such impairment; [and], (C) being regarded as having
such an impairment."' 52 Persons meeting this broad definition are gener-
ally protected from discrimination based solely on their disability under
five titles in the Act, which differ in their language and have varying
exceptions.
The ADA is widely regarded as creating much broader protections
than originally envisioned, largely due to its sweeping anti-discrimination
language and explicit extension to private actors. 153 It has already been
invoked by the Executive Branch of the federal government in denying a
state special permission to "rank" and ration health care services under
148. Id. at 796.
149. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (Supp. VI
1993).
150. Id.
151. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(5) (specifying that the ADA applies to broad areas such as
employment, public services, public, accommodations, and telecommunications).
152. Id. § 12101.
153. See, e.g., Harris Meyer & John McCormick, Disability Law Fear: What Price Equal
Access, AMERICAN MED. NEWS, Nov. 9, 1992, at 1.
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Medicaid.' 54 This type of broad coverage carries with it the possibility of
liability for the specialty boards.
a. The Argument for ADA Liability with the Specialty Boards
The argument for ADA liability in the context of the specialty boards
varies with the actual title invoked, but largely parallels an action under
section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act: certification was denied to an
"otherwise qualified" disabled individual solely on the basis of that disa-
bility. As with section 504 claims, the ADA contains language which pre-
sumably allows organizations such as specialty boards to avoid liability
for legitimate standards which disproportionately affect the disabled.
There is no appreciable case law interpreting the recently enacted
ADA. Nonetheless, its language, in combination with court decisions in-
volving similar provisions in the Rehabilitation Act and the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, allow some insight into its possible interpretation. 155 In the
following sections Titles I and III of the ADA, the provisions most likely
to be invoked in a challenge of the specialty boards, are analyzed.
2. Title I of the ADA: Employment
Title I forbids employment discrimination against a disabled individual
in any aspect of the employment relationship. 56 It states that "[n]o cov-
ered entity shall discriminate against a qualified individual with a disabil-
ity because of the disability of such individual in regard to job application
procedures, hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees, employee
compensation, job training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of
employment. "1
57
A "covered entity" is broadly defined in § 101(2) as an employer, em-
ployment agency, labor organization, or joint labor-management commit-
tee. An "employer" is further defined as a person engaged in an industry
affecting commerce, who employs more than fifteen persons. There are
154. David C. Hadom, The Problem of Discrimination in Health Care Priority Setting,
268 JAMA 1454 (1992). The plan proffered by the state of Oregon involved a trade-off:
all poor persons would be covered under the plan, but services under a certain priority
number would not be funded. The Bush administration invoked the ADA in denying the
special permission needed to institute the plan, largely citing problems in the way the pri-
orities were established. The Clinton administration subsequently approved a similar plan.
155. For example, the implementing regulations for Title III of the ADA specifically
noted that the definitions of the ADA closely parallel those used in section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act. See 56 Fed. Reg. 35,544, 35,546 (1991).
156. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a).
157. Id.
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specific exemptions for the federal government and bona fide private
membership clubs exempt from taxation under section 501(c) of the In-
ternal Revenue Act of 1986.158
The scope of Title I is largely determined by its definition of "discrimi-
nation" in § 102(b). Section 102(b)(2) states that discrimination may be
found where there is participation in a "contract or other arrangement"
that has the effect of subjecting a covered entity's qualified applicant or
employee with a disability to discrimination.' 59 Section 102(b)(5)(A)
mandates reasonable accommodation for an "otherwise qualified" appli-
cant or employee, unless the covered entity can demonstrate that the ac-
commodation would impose "undue hardship" 16° on its business
operations. 16 1 Section 102(b)(6) finds discrimination where qualification
standards are used which screen out or tend to screen out disabled indi-
viduals, unless the standard is job-related for the position in question and
shown to be consistent with "business necessity."'
62
Running throughout these definitions are the qualifications of the dis-
abled person at issue. A "qualified individual with a disability" is an indi-
vidual who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the
158. Id. § 12111(5).
159. This provision seems to parallel the third-party interference test seen in Sibley
Memorial Hospital v. Wilson, 488 F.2d 1338 (D.C. Cir. 1973); see supra notes 104-12 and
accompanying text discussing third party liability.
160. As defined under the ADA, "substantial hardship" is an action requiring "signifi-
cant difficulty or expense," which is to be evaluated by considering factors including:
(i) the nature and cost of the accommodation;
(ii) the overall financial resources of the facility or facilities involved, the number
of persons employed at such facility, the effect on expenses and resources, or the
impact otherwise of such accommodation upon the operation of the facility;
(iii) the overall financial resources of the covered entity; the overall size of the
business of a covered entity with respect to the number of employees; the
number, type and location of the facilities; and
(iv) the type of its operation or operations of the covered entity, including the
composition, structure, and function of the workforce of such entity; the geo-
graphic separateness, administrative, or fiscal relationship of the facility or facili-
ties in question to the covered entity.
42 U.S.C. § 12111(10).
161. See supra notes 123-30. This parallels the second part of the Court's two-part test
for "otherwise qualified" under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as seen in Southeastern
Community College., Note also that "reasonable accommodation" under the ADA is spe-
cifically defined to include adjustment or modifications of examinations. 42 U.S.C.
§ 12111(9).
162. This language closely parallels that used in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 with 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(6). See also supra notes 95-
96 and accompanying text.
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essential functions of the employment position held or desired.163 In de-
termining what factors of a job are essential, "consideration" is given to
the employer's judgment.
164
Title I also provides defenses for those accused of discrimination. An
employer can defeat charges of discrimination by establishing that the
qualifications at issue are "job-related and consistent with business neces-
sity," and that no reasonable accommodation is possible.165 These de-
fenses explicitly encompass the right to include job requirements that
protect the safety of others.
166
a. Analysis: The Specialty Boards and Title I
Violation of Title I involves establishing that the specialty boards, act-
ing as covered entities, discriminated against qualified disabled individu-
als in granting certification.
i. Finding the Required Employment Relationship
Because specialty boards are not traditional employers of certified phy-
sicians, they appear at first glance to be beyond the reach of Title I. An
argument may be made, however, for coverage of the boards under a
third party-interference theory, employing Sibley's interpretation of the
Title VII employer-employee relationship. 67 Specifically, it can be main-
tained that by using the term "employer" in the ADA, Congress was ex-
plicitly incorporating past judicial interpretation in the civil rights
context. This reasoning is substantially reinforced by § 102(b)(2), which
extends "discrimination" to actions by third parties which have the effect
of discriminating against a covered entity's disabled employees or
applicants.
Hospitals and many physicians' groups qualify as covered entities
under the ADA.' 68 Because these entities often use certification as an
important employment qualification, standards which tend to exclude dis-
abled physicians could be characterized as third-party interference in the
employment relationship. Under Sibley and § 102(b)(2), it appears that
such standards expose the specialty boards to ADA-based liability.
163. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8).
164. Id.
165. Id. § 12113(a).
166. Id. § 12113(b).
167. See supra notes 104-07 and accompanying text discussing third-party liability.
168. See supra notes 157-58 and accompanying text.
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ii. Defeating Liability Under Title I
Defeating liability where the requisite employment relationship is
demonstrated can occur in at least two ways. First, it may be shown that
the disabled person is not a "qualified person with a disability" as defined
by the ADA.'6 9 Second, the standard which excluded a "qualified" dis-
abled person may be upheld if that standard is "job related and consistent
with business necessity."17 Both these defenses require that no "reason-
able accommodation" is possible. 7 '
The "qualified person" and "business necessity" defenses parallel the
same concept: can the disabled person meet the standard at issue, or
some reasonable modification of that standard. "Business necessity" pro-
vides an additional defense beyond that afforded by the "qualified per-
son" language; the defense is applicable where a person is "qualified" but
additional factors make his employment problematic. Such a situation
exists where a disabled person poses a safety threat, as with an individual
infected with a communicable disease.172
As defined by the ADA, a "qualified person with a disability" is practi-
cally identical to the two-step "otherwise qualified" test under the Reha-
bilitation Act of 1973: (1) is the disabled individual able to meet the
standards at issue regardless of his or her disability; and (2) if not, is some
"reasonable accommodation" possible.' 73 Southeastern Community Col-lege,174 Doherty,175 Wynne 1,176 and Wynne//177 are thus applicable by
analogy to the determination of whether a disabled person is "qualified"
under Title 1.178 Together, they indicate that there is no obligation to
make accommodations that fundamentally alter the nature of a bene-
fit. 1 79 They also show substantial judicial deference to legitimate medical
standards decisions.' 0 Under their analysis, it is extremely difficult for
169. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a).
170. Id. § 12113(a).
171. See id. § 12111(8); § 12113(a).
172. For example, a physician infected with tuberculosis may be "qualified" physically
to treat patients, but the infection may pose a safety hazard to patients and thus invoke the
"business necessity" defense, as outlined in 42 U.S.C. § 12113(a).
173. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8); see' also supra notes 163 and 127-30 and accompanying
text.
174. 442 U.S. 397 (1979).
175. 862 F.2d 570 (6th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 810 (1989).
176. 932 F.2d 19 (1st Cir. 1991).
177. 976 F.2d 791 (1st Cir. 1992).
178. See supra notes 123-48 and accompanying text.
179. Id.
180. See supra notes 131-48 and accompanying text.
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individuals not meeting legitimate, uniformly applied certification stan-
dards to establish themselves as "qualified," where a specialty board
maintained in good faith that no "reasonable accommodation" was
possible.
18 1
Should the qualifications necessary for a disabled individual to become
board certified somehow be established, a specialty board could still de-
feat liability by invoking the "business necessity" defenses found in § 103.
A particularly powerful claim here is that board standards contribute to
the safe practice of specialty medicine.' 82 This parallels the language of
§ 103(b), and the safety rationale accepted by the Court in allowing limi-
tations on "reasonable accommodations" in Southeastern Community
College.183
3. Title III: Public Accommodations and Services Operated by
Private Entities
a. Provisions of Title III
Title III broadly prohibits discrimination against disabled individuals
with regard to public accommodations. 84 It provides that "[n]o individ-
ual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full and
equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages,
or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person
who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommoda-
tion.' 185 "Public accommodations" include the professional offices of
health care providers and hospitals, as well as "other service
establishments.'
186
Discriminatory activities need not be direct, as denial of participation
via "contractual, licensing, or other arrangements" is covered under Title
111.187 In addition, various specific acts of discrimination are barred,
including:
(i) the imposition or application of eligibility criteria that screen
out or tend to screen out individuals with a disability, unless
181. See supra Section III of this text analyzing the Specialty Boards and their relation-
ship to section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.
182. This argument may be difficult to make because certification is not necessary for
the practice of specialty medicine.
183. See supra notes 123-30 and accompanying text.
184. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a).
185. Id.
186. Id. § 12181(7)(F).
187. Id. § 12182(b)(a)(A)(i)-(iv).
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such criteria can be shown to be necessary for the provision of
goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommoda-
tions being offered;
(ii) failure to make reasonable modifications in policies, prac-
tices, or procedures, unless such modification would fundamen-
tally alter the nature of the privilege or advantage. 88
In addition, § 309 mandates that certain examinations be given in a
manner which is accessible to disabled individuals. Section 309 states that
"[any person that offers examinations or courses related to... certifica-
tion ... for ... professional, or trade purposes shall offer such examina-
tions or courses in a place and manner accessible to persons with
disabilities or offer alternative accessible arrangements for such individu-
als." These accommodations need not be made if they represent an un-
due burden or fundamentally alter the measure of skills and knowledge
sought. 189 This provision applies to the specialty boards and their certifi-
cation examinations; the ABMS acknowledges as much, and publishes an
unofficial handbook to assist the boards with compliance.' 9° Of even
greater importance is the potential applicability of Title III's general pro-
tections to substantive standards for board certification.
b. Analysis: The Boards and Title III
i. Finding General Coverage
Title III is most easily applied to the specialty boards if they are consid-
188. Id. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(i),(ii).
189. 28 C.F.R. § 36.309(b)(3) (1993).
190. AMERICAN BD. OF MED. SPECIALTIES, HANDBOOK ON BOARD CERTIFICATION
AND THE AMERICANS wrrm DISABILrIES ACT (Bashook & Dockery, eds., 1992)[hereinaf-
ter ADA HANDBOOK]. This resource suggests a number of specialty board activities for
compliance with § 309:
(1) develop a written policy on examination accommodations that appears on all
board application literature; (2) establish procedures for the Board's responses to
applicants requesting accommodations (including announcements, forms, re-
sponses to inquires); (3) set reasonable timetables for application, review, verifi-
cation, and approval that will allow a candidate to take the examination on
schedule with other applicants if the candidate supplies documentation in a timely
manner; (4) identify expert consultants in various disabilities to assess documen-
tation and perform applicant evaluation, if needed; (5) have the Board retain re-
sponsibility to determine ADA eligibility and recommend Board action on
accommodations; (6) provide explicit instruction to Board staff on how to re-
spond to various requests for accommodation; (7) keep a log of board activities in
responding to applicant requests.
Id. at 9-10. The book further suggests that accommodation can only be undertaken on a
case-by-case basis. Id. at 23.
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ered a public accommodation. In defining "public accommodation,"
§ 301(7)(F) does not explicitly cover the boards, though it does cover hos-
pitals and providers' offices. This definition is not exhaustive because it
allows "other service establishments" to be considered "public accommo-
dations." Comments to implementing regulations further explain that
"other service establishments" are establishments operated by private en-
tities which affect commerce. 191 The specialty boards, as private entities
which have an effect on the commerce of medicine, can be included plau-
sibly among "other service establishments" under these definitions and
explanations.
There is additional evidence to support the classification of specialty
boards as "public accommodations." Initially, the statute itself clearly
states its purpose as "provid[ing] clear, strong, consistent, enforceable
standards for the elimination of discrimination against individuals with
disabilities," and "invok[ing] the sweep of congressional power .. .in
order to address [this discrimination]."192 Section 309 indicates clear con-
gressional intent to cover at least the administration of certification ex-
aminations and congressional awareness of the board certification system.
Although the statutory language does not specifically classify the boards
as "public accommodations," neither does it explicitly exempt them.
Thus, there are grounds to suggest that classifying specialty boards as
"public accommodations" is not inherently unreasonable.
Further support for such a conclusion derives from congressional treat-
ment of judicial decisions interpreting the Rehabilitation Act. Congress
demonstrated its awareness of cases such as Southeastern Community
College by incorporating language from these decisions into the ADA.
193
As these cases involved judicial examination of substantive standards in a
medical setting, the failure of Congress to specifically disavow such analy-
sis may indicate tacit congressional approval of such examination of pro-
fessional standards. The specialty boards, by providing standards for
various medical specialties, are easily encompassed by such a theory of
judicial review.
It is still unclear whether a court would find that the specialty boards
constitute "public accommodations." The lack of specific coverage for
substantive board standards, in light of explicit coverage in § 309, argues
against such a classification. In addition, the fact that listed "public ac-
191. 56 Fed. Reg. 35,553 (1991).
192. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(b)(1), (4).
193. See supra note 161 and accompanying text.
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commodations," such as hospitals and doctors' offices, are locations
which must physically accommodate the disabled further suggests that the
provision "other service establishments" was not meant to include stan-
dard-setting organizations.
Another theory may bring the boards under the coverage of Title III.
In the Title's enumeration of prohibited activities, there are repeated ref-
erences to discrimination by "contractual, licensing, or other arrange-
ments."'194 This language suggests that any party interfering with the
relationship between a disabled person and a public accommodation
could be subject to liability. 9 Hospitals and physicians' professional of-
fices are explicitly defined as "public accommodations" in the ADA. 96
Certification could constitute the "other arrangement" which interferes
with a disabled physician's relationship with such public accommodations.
While coverage under this theory is less convincing than defining the
boards as a public accommodation, it is nonetheless a relatively reason-
able interpretation of the statutory language.
ii. The Impact of Title III Coverage
If coverage under Title III is found, the specialty boards' substantive
standards would be subject to the general requirements of Title III.'"
Implementing regulations would then require that the boards demon-
strate that standards which screen out or tend to screen out the disabled
are necessary to the benefits of certification.198 In addition, modifications
to certification standards would be required, unless such modifications
fundamentally alter the certification process.' 99 In short, the specialty
boards would have to account for any certification standards which have
an impact on disabled physicians.2
194. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(a)(i)7(iv).
195. This statutory language parallels the third-party interference theory as discussed
under Sibley Memorial Hospital v. Wilson, 488 F.2d 1338 (D.C. Cir. 1973); see also supra
notes 104-07 and accompanying text. This theory is also discussed in the context of Title I
of the ADA. See supra note 159 and accompanying text.
196. 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)(F).
197. See supra note 157 and accompanying text.
198. 28 C.F.R. § 36.301 (1993). These regulations track ADA § 302(b)(2)(A)(i), 42
U.S.C. § 12181(b)(2)(A)(1); see also supra note 162 and accompanying text.
199. 28 C.F.R. § 36, 302 (1993). These regulations track ADA § 302(b)(2)(A)(ii), 42
U.S.C. § 12181(b)(2)(A)(ii); see also supra note 162 and accompanying text.
200. While commenting only on the implications of § 309, the recent unofficial ABMS
handbook addressing the ADA and certification suggested that the specialty boards under-
take a review of their examination programs from the perspective of essential clinical skills
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iii. Escaping Liability Under Title III
As with Title I, liability under Title III may be defeated under a variety
of theories. Any board facing liability must initially establish that its cer-
tification standards are "necessary" for bestowing the benefit of certifica-
tion.20 ' Because changes in a factor "necessary" for the provision of
benefit must "fundamentally alter" that benefit, the test for determining
necessity must be analytically similar to determining whether an accom-
modation is reasonable under the Rehabilitation Act.202 Given this logic,
cases such as Southeastern Community College, indicating substantial ju-
dicial deference to legitimate medical standards, are applicable in estab-
lishing criteria as "necessary. ,203
Once standards are proven "necessary" for certification, a board must
show that no reasonable accommodation is possible to avoid their modifi-
cation. 2° Modifications are not reasonable if they "fundamentally alter"
a benefit, language which tracks Southeastern Community College and
makes its analysis applicable.20 5 As noted previously, Southeastern Com-
munity College and its line of related cases indicate a strong judicial def-
erence to legitimate medical standards. 2°
Finally, a specialty board may escape liability under the "direct threat"
exception. Specifically, implementing regulations contain a blanket ex-
ception to instances where allowing a person to participate in a benefit
would pose a direct threat to the health and safety of others.20 7 A spe-
cialty board, presenting its certification standards as safety standards,
may be able to successfully invoke this exception, considering the demon-
strated deference given medical standard settings.2°8
IV. CONCLUSION: SPECIALTY BOARDS AND CIVIL RIGHTS STATUTES
Certification amounts to a regulation of specialty medicine by private,
and knowledge that are fundamental for certification. ADA HANDBOOK, supra note 190,
at 26.
201. See supra note 162 and accompanying text.
202. An accommodation under the Rehabilitation Act's "otherwise qualified" language
is not reasonable if that accommodation "fundamentally alters" a benefit. See supra notes
127-30 and accompanying text.
203. See supra notes 123-48 and accompanying text.
204. See supra note 162 and accompanying text.
205. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii); 28 C.F.R. § 36.302.
206. See supra notes 123-48.
207. 28 C.F.R. § 36.208. This argument parallels the safety-based defense under the
"business necessity" exemption of Title I of the ADA.
208. See supra note 133-34 and accompanying text.
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independent, quasi-academic ABMS-recognized boards. While certain
identifiable groups may fail to achieve certification in proportionate num-
bers, this result appears to be a function of uniformly applied objective
standards, not intentional discrimination. The nature of the specialty
boards and their uniform application of certification standards make es-
tablishing board liability under federal civil rights laws difficult. The spe-
cialty boards' position may be further strengthened by a clear explanation
of the goals of certification, including an explanation of the relationship
of certification standards to achievement of those goals. Combined, the
nature of the boards, uniform application of standards, and an adequate
explanation of those standards should allow the specialty boards to defeat
most challenges brought under federal civil rights law.

